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Washington, D. C. 20505

NEAC # 1745-79/1

9 APR **1979**

Dear Dr. Pastor:

I look forward to your participation in an evening discussion and dinner at CIA Headquarters on Thursday, 12 April, as one of a small company of responsible officials and specialists concerned with Cuban affairs. Our discussion will be focused on the Cuban domestic scene, which we may be prone to neglect because of our greater interest in Cuba's current foreign adventures. Hence, with some license, our subject is: "Imperial Cuba: the Home Front."

I do not suggest that the subject has been altogether neglected. Some observers have gone so far as to suggest that Africa will be Cuba's "Vietnam." Moreover, it is true that the number of Cuban military personnel in Africa (about 35,000) is roughly 1.2% of the labor force, or nearly twice the percentage of the United States labor force in Vietnam (0.65%) in 1968. So far, however, the domestic impact of this Cuban commitment seems to have been wholly manageable.

Nevertheless, Cuba does face major problems. These include economic and related social pressures that are mainly generated by the low world price of sugar though they evidently are attributed, certainly by some Cubans, possibly by very many, to the African involvement. In any case, it is reasonable to assume that we shall be hearing increasingly from new elements in the Cuban elite. These are sure to include returning African veterans (both military and non-military) as well as the so-called "technocrats." The latter have been in evidence for some years, but they have not yet attained positions of influence in the hierarchy. The Cuban power elite, except for still-active members of the pre-Castro communist party, is still relatively young. Nevertheless, over the next decade, the regime is likely to face increasing pressures, including the familiar revolution of rising expectations, as a post-revolutionary generation makes its growing demands upon the limited political and economic Cuban resource base. The impact of events upon the economy of Cuba and upon the composition and coherence of the ruling groups in Cuba is clearly a subject we should explore.

Our discussion will be led off by Professors Jorge Dominguez of Harvard and Edward Gonzalez of U.C.L.A., both of whom are productive scholars of Cuban affairs who have recently visited that country. Our other outside guests will come mainly from the State Department. From inside CIA, among others, I am inviting the Chief and two analysts from our Cuba Analytic Center. I am enclosing an unclassified paper prepared by three of our analysts for a recent academic conference that may help to fuel our discussion. It is my expectation that after brief introductory remarks by our visiting professors we shall have a general discussion into which all will enter with vigor.

The plan for our evening is as follows: The company will assemble in my conference room (7D64) in the CIA Headquarters Building in Langley between 5:30 and 6:00. Refreshments will be served. Our discussion will then begin at 6:00 and continue until approximately 9:00. Dinner will be served at 7:00 at the conference table.

STAT

I have asked	
the arrangements. have to him. His	Please have your office address any questions you may telephone number is
nave to min. 11(5	cerephone number 12

Yours sincerely,

18/ Stansfield Turner

STANSFIELD TURNER

Enclosure

Dr. Robert A. Pastor National Security Council Senior Staff Member Room 392 OEOB 17th & Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D. C. 20506

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Letter to Dr. Robert A. Pastor, NSC

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NFAC/CAR (5 April 1979)

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JBJECT: (Optional) Letters of Thursday, 12 April		to the	Discussion/Dinner on Cuba, NFAC * 1738/79
COM: Coordinator for AcRelations, NFAC	cademic	EXTENSION	NO. ER 79 - 6884/1
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DCI &	apil april	15/am	To 3: David McGiffert and Viron Vaky have both regretted. McGiffert will be represented
	,	,	by RADM Gordon Schuller, who is the ISA director for Inter- American Affairs. Vaky will
NARC			be represented by Luigi Einauwho is his policy planning,
NFAC/CAR			congressional, and public relations man. The two professors will be
			here working with the Cuban Center. I have not included letters to them in the packet
			The memo to the Agency guests is coming forward separately. DDO is included.
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